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How To Do Things With Causes1 
Nancy Cartwright 
University of California-San Diego and the London School of 
Economics and Political Science 
Presidential Address delivered before the Eighty-Third Annual Pacific 
Division Meeting of The American Philosophical Association in Vancouver, 
British Columbia, on Friday, April 10, 2009. 
1. An unnerving thesis 
"It simply wouldn't be true to say, 'Nancy LD Cartwright...if you own a 
TIAA life insurance policy you'll live longer.' But it is a fact, nonetheless, 
that persons insured by TIAA do enjoy longer lifetimes, on the average, 
than persons insured by commercial insurance companies that serve the 
general public."2 
This is from a letter urging me to buy TIAA life insurance: it's cheaper? 
college professors don't on the whole die young. It was the first sentence 
in my first paper on causality. Correlation, I remarked, is not causation. 
That is well known. But when I started my career you weren't allowed 
to believe it. Like a good Humean, you could believe in regularities and 
that's all. Causation?all the causation we were allowed?is correlation, 
just special correlations, ones with bells on. 
This view had ramifications in decision theory. As a philosopher of 
science I cared about decision theory because I believed that science 
and philosophy were not only going to help us represent the world but to 
change it. That was, after all, the point of Selma, the march on Washington, 
the protest against the war, and the Utopian communes. When it came to 
theories of how to decide what actions would be effective, the bar against 
causation had impact. Central versions of decision theory had been using 
the conditional probability of R on A?P(R/A)?to represent the probability 
that if I were to do act A, R would result. But P(R/A) is just correlation. And 
no bells will fix that. The probability that you will live longer if you buy TIAA 
insurance is high, but if you want an effective strategy for living longer, I 
urged in this early paper, you should do something not just associated with 
this result. You should do something connected by causal law. 
This paper was one of the early forays in a growing movement to 
reinstate causality as a respectable member of our ontology. The paper 
was entitled "Causal Laws and Effective Strategies," and that marked out 
the thrust of the argument. Not all associations are equal. Some provide 
effective strategies, others do not; the difference is that the first are 
expressions of causal laws. 
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This kind of argument has been echoed repeatedly; one especially 
powerful voice for it now comes from the prominent invariance-under 
manipulation camp of causality. I think this is unfortunate. For the first 
unnerving conclusion I argue for here is that causal laws are not, after 
all, much of a guide to action. If true this conclusion has far more than 
philosophical import. We?society as a whole and special institutions 
within it, from pharmaceuticals to the U.S. Department of Education? 
spend a vast amount of money, intellectual effort, and talent to establish 
causal laws, and we do so because we believe they are a guide to action. 
2. What's in store 
So that is the first thesis I will defend here: 
Thesis 1: Causal laws are not an especially good guide to effective 
strategy.3 
Although the problem is not identified in this stark form by others, 
there is a hugely popular fix on offer at the moment: invariance. This leads 
to my second thesis: 
Thesis 2: Invariance is no rescue. 
Causal laws aren't especially invariant. 
If invariance is available, we don't need causal laws. 
I shall then unashamedly argue for an old idea of mine, the nomological 
machine, which I have not fussed over much for almost twenty years. But 
effective strategies matter and I believe these machines matter to effective 
strategies; we mustn't be fobbed off with just invariance or we'll never 
know how to do it. 
Hence - 
Thesis 3: "Nomological machines" are the prime source of the 
special laws that are good for strategy. 
And finally 
Thesis 4: "Nomological machines" are the real engines of 
change. 
I take up again my old theme of nomological machines because I think 
we are doing it wrong?both in philosophy and in practice, and the two 
support each other. Evidence-based policy is now mandated at the local, 
the national, and the international level. What are we supposed to take as 
evidence that a policy will be effective? We are told: "A rigorous test that 
a causal law holds"; and when it comes to rigorous tests for causal laws, 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are all the rage. The evidence-based 
policy community knows though that RCTs are not enough because of 
the conventional trade-off between internal and external validity. RCTs are 
good on internal validity. A successful well-conducted RCT can establish 
with a high degree of certainty that the treatment causes the outcome in the 
population involved in the experiment under the conditions under which 
the treatment is administered in the experiment. The result has external 
validity if it holds for other populations under other circumstances. So 
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practitioners as well as philosophers are going in for invariance. They are, 
among other things, investing heavily in devising statistical tests to check 
whether different sets of data support an invariance hypothesis. 
I think this is the wrong way to go, or at least we should not be putting 
all our eggs in this basket. Testing for invariance is of limited use. We need 
instead to understand invariance, in particular to understand where it 
comes from, especially one major source, which I call the nomological 
machine. When we don't understand the machine and how it works, we 
can easily implement policies without ensuring the concomitant factors 
necessary to support the causal connection between action and output, 
and we don't get what we want. Worse, when we focus on invariance, 
looking to see when "the same old thing" will be true again, we ignore 
a far more powerful policy instrument, the possibility of building new 
nomological machines that give rise to new causal laws. So my worries 
about casual laws and effective strategies have real practical bite. Casual 
laws won't do the job and invariance is a weak fix. For effective strategies 
we need something more and different. I call this a nomological machine 
and have developed a theory about it. If you don't like the term or the 
theory, then let's get a better one. Because we can't do just with causal 
laws and invariances. 
3. A nineteenth-century distinction 
I am not alone in defending the importance of nomological machines for 
securing the kind of reliable laws employed in day-to-day strategizing. I read 
the defenders of mechanisms?my colleague Bill Bechtel4 and Machamer, 
Darden and Craver (MDC)5?as doing the same. The problem is that 
"mechanism" is a term with a thousand meanings, which is why I made 
up a new term to pick out just what I thought we needed. And the special 
problem right now is that there is one other sense of "mechanism" that 
is sweeping the field and that, I maintain, cannot do the job: mechanism 
in the sense of "invariant causal law." Sometimes these two senses are 
conflated. So the story I am going to tell here is a tale of two senses of 
mechanism.6 
I want to appeal to a nineteenth-century distinction to drive home 
my point, a distinction elaborated by the historian Norton Wise in a 
lovely paper on automata.7 It has long been noticed, as Wise puts it, 
that nineteenth-century automata are typically women or "other sorts of 
uncanny or exotic creatures: talented children, blacks, acrobats, monkeys, 
magicians."8 Automata perform mechanical actions that produce effects. 
The mechanical woman moves the pen and causes marks on the paper. 
But her action is merely mechanical. It is reliable. But the virtue of reliability 
is the flipside of a defect. The causal pattern is repetitive and unoriginal; 
little can be accomplished with it. 
This, according to Wise, is a conventional nineteenth-century theme, 
which he illustrates across a number of discourses. Consider H.G. Wells's 
The Time Machine. The life of the Eloi is one of sameness and repetition. 
The Eloi is "a perfect mechanism" according to the time traveler. They 
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are adapted "to a life of 'mere mechanical industry'." But they are not 
adapted to intelligent or creative action. The traveler remarks: "There is no 
intelligence where there is no change and no need to change."9 Another 
case is Charles Babbage. Babbage divided objects of machinery into "1st, 
Those which are employed to produce power; and as, 2dly, Those which 
are intended merely to transmit force and execute work." 
The nineteenth-century difference is between engines and 
mechanisms. Wise explains: "[EJngine always implied productive power, 
as in referring to the differential calculus as 'the engine of analysis', while 
'mechanism'...referred to a device for executing a particular form of 
motion, typically repetitive."10 And, of course, the nineteenth century had 
it back to front with women as the automata (and workers on the factory 
floor) and men as the powerful and rational engines driving change and 
production. 
The advocates of invariance?the view I worry about here?call their 
invariant laws "mechanisms." I shall allow them this term, but in Wise's 
nineteenth-century sense, of reliable, repetitive, unoriginal transmitters of 
work; the advocates of this view I call the "Mechanics." The items that really 
matter for understanding and for securing good strategies, I shall argue, 
are nomological machines including, if I am right in my interpretation of 
them, the mechanisms of Bechtel and MDC. These are the basic source 
both of stability and of change; following Babbage and Wise, I'll call these 
engines, and their advocates "Engineers." Before I begin the argument 
then, let me introduce the dominant players on the opposition side: James 
Woodward,11 Judea Pearl,12 Daniel Steel,13 the econometrician David 
Hendry,14 Peter Spirtes,15 Jon Williamson,16 and Christopher Hitchcock.17 
To see how invariance enters, turn back to my original defense that 
causal laws earn their citizenship in our ontology because they sort 
effective from ineffective strategies. 
4. Ooops: a badly flawed argument 
TIAA is right, I argued: P(long life/TIAA insurance purchasers) is not 
a reliable guide for predicting whether I would increase my chance of 
living longer should I buy TIAA insurance. Still, for decision making 
under uncertainty and for cost-benefit analysis, we need a probability, if 
not the conditional probability, then the probability of a counterfactual 
conditional. What should it be? I, and a number of others at the time (like 
Brian Skyrms),18 recommended a method that social scientists use to find 
causes, a method at the heart of Patrick Suppes's probabilistic theory of 
causality and also of the currently fashionable Bayes-nets methods for 
causal inference. To test whether C causes E, look to see if C and E are 
correlated once we have stratified on the other causes that can produce E 
by different routes.19 
Having a healthy life-style and basic good health causes longevity. Being 
a college professor does not cause longevity but it is correlated with these 
other two factors; that's why being a professor is correlated with longevity. 
Stratify on these other factors and the correlation disappears. Among 
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those with a healthy life style and basic good health, being a professor is 
no longer correlated with living long; nor is it correlated among those with 
unhealthy life styles and poor basic health. That is the idea behind using, 
not the conditional probabilities, P(E7C) versus P(E/-C), as a test for the 
causal law "C causes E," but rather the partial conditional probabilities, 
P(E/C&K.) versus P(E/-C&K.), where the K. are the various different strata 
in which factors that affect E by different routes are held fixed. This is 
sometimes called formula CC (Causal Connection): 
(cc) p(Eyc&K.) > PCEy-c&Kj).20 
What justifies this method for inferring general causal claims? Here 
is my answer, which I think is the best we will get. In many domains of 
enquiry?maybe most?if two factors are correlated, there should be an 
explanation and the explanation should be provided by causal laws. One 
explanation for a correlation between two factors is that one of these factors 
causes the other. If we can eliminate all other possible explanations, this 
must be the right one. Stratification promises to do just that, by eliminating 
background correlations with confounding causal factors, such as healthy 
lifestyle and good diet.21 
This formula might be a good idea then, though it does not provide a 
reductive account of causality, which many have hoped for. This was the 
core of my argument that we need some robust non-Humean concept of 
causality. We may start out trying to admit only associations. But 
Premise 1. For predicting the effectiveness of strategies, some 
associations are better than others. 
Which are the good ones? 
Premise 2. If A is to be an effective strategy for R it is not correlation 
between A and R that matters but rather P(R/A&K.) > P(R/-A&K/). 
But what is K ? i 
Premise 3. K. describes a situation that is homogeneous with respect 
to all and only "other" causal factors for R. Nothing more nor less 
will do. 
We may want to rely on associations but 
Conclusion. The difference between effective and ineffective 
strategies does not depend on associations alone but on facts about 
caused laws?on what the K.'s are. 
The conclusion is correct. But my argument for it was no good. Look at 
premise 2. For an effective strategy for getting R's, I urged, we want what 
we would call a cause of R. Formula CC shows whether A is a cause of 
R. So CC shows that A is an effective strategy for R.22 But even granting 
that strategies must be causes, which I will soon challenge, the formula 
that shows that A is a cause of R need not be the right formula for telling 
whether A will produce R when we introduce it. 
Here is one reason we might have thought it was. Some arrangement 
or other must obtain, willy-nilly, when we set about changing A. Call it K. 
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and consider the following formula which is a trivial consequence of the 
probability calculus: 
P(R/K.) = P(R/A&IC) P(A/IC) + P(R/-A&K.) (1 - P(A/K.)). 
Suppose P(R/A&K.) > P(R/-A&K.). Then it seems that increasing P(A/K.) 
will increase P(R/IC). So in situation K., introducing more A's will yield 
more R's. 
No; and for two reasons. First, when we introduce A we generally 
change other factors?not just ones causally "downstream" from A, but 
factors that have independent routes for affecting R. In that case we will no 
longer be in situation K. but in some new situation K.. Then what's relevant 
is whether P(R/A&IC) > P(R/-A&K.). But that's not right, for the second 
reason. P(A/K.) cannot change without the basic probability measure 
changing. In the probability measure designated by P, P(A/K.) is as it is. To 
reflect a different set-up with a different frequency of A's, and perhaps of 
R's, we need a new probability measure, say P\ The effectiveness of A as 
a strategy for getting R's then depends on a better Strategy Effectiveness 
formula: 
(SE) P'(R/A&L) > P(R/-A&K.) 
where P' is the new probability measure and L is the new (causally 
homogeneous) situation that will obtain once we have fiddled with the 
frequency of A's. Note that L may not even involve the same set of causal 
factors that K does since when we fiddle with the probability, we can easily 
alter the causal laws as well, changing facts about what other factors affect 
R and how. Indeed, fiddling with the probability without fiddling with the 
causal laws may be impossible since, I hazard, it is the exact form of the 
causal laws that sets the probabilities. 
Let us return now to (CC) and get clear about just when it can tell us 
about the results of changing A: 
(CC) P(R/A&Kj) > P(R/-A&Ki). 
CC guarantees that P(R) increases if we do A only if among the causes of 
R we change A (and its downstream effects) and only A, so that K. stays 
the same. Lots of our interventions are not like that. The California class 
size reduction program is a well-known example.23 The desired outcome, 
increased reading scores, didn't result. That's because the program was 
rolled out statewide over a short time. Halving the size of classes means 
doubling the number of teachers and the number of classrooms. There 
weren't that many qualified teachers available in that short a time, nor 
classroom space. The good effects of smaller classes were offset by the 
bad effects of poor teachers and poor facilities. (And, naturally, the most 
disadvantaged schools by and large got the worst teachers.) 
Though this problem is serious, it is not the one I want to focus on. My 
worries here center on three further restrictions: 
i) It's not enough that the factors in K. stay fixed. It is because K. 
picks out the other causal factors for R that the correlation between 
A and R with K. fixed shows that A causes R. This means that in 
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changing P(A) we must not change the other causal laws that have 
R in their consequent, neither adding nor subtracting from them. 
ii) Nor must we undermine the very causal law that connects A and 
R if we are to hope to increase P(R) by increasing P(A). 
iii) P(R/A&IC) and P(R/-A&K.) must also stay fixed, which may or 
may not follow from i) and ii) depending on views about whether 
the causal laws fix the associated probabilities. 
These restrictions are just what we need to tell whether A and R are 
connected by causal law. But they are not tailored to tell what will happen 
if we introduce A to bring about R. So this is the first point I want to make 
in arguing that causal laws are not all that good as guides to effective 
strategies. My own way of making them so those many years ago rested 
on a mistake. CC is a good way of establishing or testing causal laws; it 
may even be a characterizing feature of them: Jiggle a cause in just the 
right way and the effect jiggles too. But the right way of jiggling A to test if it 
causes R is almost never the way we would expect to do it to produce R. 
5. The bad penny 
This mistake, like a bad penny, keeps turning up. Interventionist, invariance, 
and manipulationist accounts of causality abound now. These make the 
same connection between strategy and causal law that I did; and thirty 
years later many make exactly the same mistake. If A causes R is a true 
causal law, then CC holds for it. Hence we can increase P(R) by increasing 
P(A). This is at the heart of the manipulation theorems of Peter Spirtes 
and Clark Glymour and their associates and is also at the core of Pearl's 
semantics for counterfactual conditionals, as well as Woodward's more 
informal approach. But what about i) 
- 
iii)? Here is where mechanisms 
enter. The Mechanics take causal laws to be like levers: Jiggling at the 
cause end produces changes at the effect end. This won't work if the 
causal laws are not invariant when we use them, as required by i)-iii). So 
the Mechanics temper the levers so they will not be brittle. 
There are various views about tempering on offer: 
1. Causal laws generally are tempered (even under real 
manipulations). 
2. Don't call something a causal law unless it is tempered, even if it 
passes other standard tests for being a causal law. 
3. There is always some way to use even a glass lever. 
I don't hold much truck with 2. and 3. 2. only connects causal laws and 
effective strategies by fiat, and 3. doesn't justify the huge efforts we put 
into causal laws in the hope of putting them to practical use. What about 
1.? Are causal laws generally invariant, or invariant enough under realistic 
manipulations? There are two major kinds of invariance I worry about. 
Locality. Few?perhaps none?of the causal laws we rely on for 
our day-to-day strategies are universal, God-given laws. Causal laws are 
generally only locally true. They almost always depend on an underlying 
structure that gives rise to them and to which they are bound. Manipulating 
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the same cause does not produce the same effect for other generating 
structures. 
Consider the lever that constitutes my car's throttle. Pushing on that 
lever makes the object the lever sits on accelerate. This causal law is true 
in my car and probably in yours and it's typically invariant across cars and 
trucks and even tractors. And it is a law that supports a strategy that most of 
us depend on many times a day, day in and day out. But this law is not true 
for most levers. Take a random sample of levers in the world and almost 
none of them will make the object they sit on accelerate. This important 
law is local, local to specific kinds of structures that give rise to it. I call 
structures like this, "nomological machines." A nomological machine is 
a stable (enough) arrangement of components whose features acting in 
consort give rise to (relatively) stable input/output relations. Most, if not 
all, causal laws hold only locally, relative to a nomological machine that 
ensures them. 
Fragility. The second kind of invariance I worry about is fragility. So 
many of the causal laws I know break, and so readily, when we try to use 
them. Winding up the toy soldier causes him to march?if only you don't 
wind too tightly. Typing on my computer keyboard causes writing on my 
screen?if only I don't knock a cup of coffee over onto the keyboard. 
Are these cases typical? I should like to urge that they are not untypical; 
that we know that; and that we worry about it. Consider the famous Lucas 
critique in economics.24 Nobel-prize-winning Chicago economist Robert 
Lucas insisted that we cannot rely on even fairly well-established economic 
causal regularities to set policy. That's because these regularities arise 
from a more basic structure of individual decisions depending on "tastes 
and technology" and constrained by custom, law, regulation, institutional 
structure and human psychology?that is, they depend on a nomological 
machine. When the government intervenes, Lucas argued, it often disturbs 
this underlying system and in a way that destroys the very causal law that 
the government might use to predict the effects of its interventions. 
6. Invariance and its values 
In an irenic spirit we might note that, for reliable strategy, we do not 
need to settle how prevalent invariance is. Invariance is enough to 
ensure effectiveness. So base your strategies only on causal laws that are 
invariant. 
This irenic remark may be good for peace in the profession, but it 
does not support the special status of causal laws. Recall, casual laws are 
supposed to have a special connection with strategy that is lacking for 
mere associations. But "What's good for the goose is good for the gander" 
applies to causal laws and associations. Tempering is good for both. There 
is nothing special about causal laws here. As Sandra Mitchell urges,25 any 
claim that continues to be true when you act will be good for predicting the 
results of that action. What matters is not the causality but the invariance. 
So if you add invariance as a requirement, you don't need a causal law to 
start with. 
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But, one may question, perhaps causal laws are the only things that are 
invariant? Last section I argued that it is far from the truth that all causal 
laws are invariant under typical manipulations we might make based on 
them. Still, perhaps it is only causal laws that are invariant. I think not at 
all so. The argument that only causal laws are invariant rests on the same 
mistake as the argument that all (or almost all) causal laws are invariant? 
the bad penny argument. 
Recall: The appeal of the view that causal laws are invariant under 
strategy manipulation typically comes from mistakenly assimilating 
manipulations we make in order to achieve effects with those we make to 
test causal laws. These latter manipulations?those that test causal laws? 
must leave the causal laws invariant by definition. The test would be no 
test if it added or subtracted the very thing it was testing for. Similarly, the 
appeal of the view that only causal laws are invariant also comes from a 
blinkered view of manipulation. 
The standard argument proceeds via a hasty generalization to the 
contrapositive. It is common to remark that some paradigmatic non 
causal regularities are not invariant. This is generalized to: No non-causal 
laws are invariant. From which follows: If it is invariant, it is casual. The 
standard examples are of joint effects, say Ex and E2, of a common cause. 
These are regularly associated?so called "spurious correlation." Jiggling 
one, it is noted, will not jiggle the other. 
Or will it? 
What is the case is that if Ej is jiggled in just the way it must be jiggled 
to test if E1 causes E2?with all three conditions i)-iii) satisfied?then 
E2 will not change in train. But this is not the kind of manipulation we 
generally make. Among those we do commonly make, a large number 
leave spurious associations like this invariant. And many of these we rely 
on?and reasonably so?for strategy. 
Consider. I was at Stanford when I married Stuart Hampshire, who 
was just retiring from Oxford. I worried: Stuart, do you really want to leave 
Oxford and take the job that Stanford is offering you? Stuart reasoned just 
the way TIAA advised me not to. "If I buy TIAA insurance, I'll live longer" he 
assured me. His reasoning was correct. The association between buying 
TIAA insurance and the chance of living longer would be invariant for 
him because of the way he would do it. He would do so by becoming a 
professor in California, freed from the miasma of the Thames Valley. 
This is not a singular example. I maintain that for the most part our 
day-to-day strategies are underwritten by the input/output regularities of a 
nomological machine. The input/output regularities look like causal laws 
from the outside. But sometimes when we study the inner workings, we 
see that the variable we manipulate is only spuriously related to the output 
achieved. To steer an aircraft, or an electron beam, you keep a needle 
centered on a dial. The inner workings of the steering mechanism assure 
that (just as with Stuart and the insurance for U.S. college professors) you 
can't do that without?inside the machine?adjusting a common cause of 
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both the needle position and the direction of the aircraft, or the electron 
beam. 
Or consider...you want to eliminate some serious hard-to-observe 
internal effects of a disease. To do so, you try out a variety of treatments that 
make more superficial external symptoms disappear. As with Stuart and 
the insurance or centering the needle to steer, you do so in the hope that, 
with one of these treatments, the way you make the external symptoms 
disappear is by eliminating the disease that is the common cause of both 
the superficial symptoms and the serious problems. 
In offering this kind of example, I do not want to quarrel with the 
common assumption that a feature of the world cannot change unless 
a cause of it changes. Rather, I quarrel with the dual assumptions that 
the manipulations we make in day-to-day strategizing are like the surgical 
interventions that test in the ideal for causes; and that the regularities we 
rely on, and reasonably so, must be causal laws. I repeat: Any conditional 
that is invariant when we manipulate the antecedent in the way that we 
will in fact manipulate it is as good any other for predicting the effects of 
our manipulations. It needn't be?and often isn't?a casual law. 
Indeed, we don't even need invariance. What we need is truth.26 As 
Julian Reiss urges:27 Just go for a right answer. We do not need to start 
with claims that have been true somewhere, then look for them to be 
true in the situation at hand. We need a prediction that is true under the 
manipulations we propose. This is very much the point of another Nobel 
prize winning Chicago economist, Milton Friedman, in his defense of 
unrealistic models in economics.28 It doesn't matter if the model does not 
resemble the target situation; what matters is that the conclusion of the 
model is true for the target. 
We are back now at the starting problem. With respect to effective 
strategies, what is special about causal laws? If we maintain that not all 
causal laws support strategies, only those that are invariant, we've made 
no special place for causal laws. Any invariant claim will do. Similarly, if we 
maintain that only those causal laws that are true given the manipulations 
proposed support strategy, again we have found no special place for causal 
laws. Any true claim will do. Once we have either invariance or truth we 
don't need causality. 
Is there nothing then that is special about causal laws? Let's think 
about Friedman. The objection we raise in my philosophy of economics 
classes to Friedman's unrealistic models is that they are not useful. It is not 
correct that all we need from the modeling exercise is true predictions. 
We need some way of judging before the fact, some marker, for which 
these are. That is the point of the realistic model: If the premises in the 
model are true in the target, then the conclusion should be, too. The 
marker for true conclusions is true premises, which can in principle be 
checked independently. 
In our case support from a causal law was supposed to be the relevant 
marker for an effective strategy. But this marker, I have been arguing, 
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isn't reliable enough. The Mechanics add invariance. Though invariance 
won't save causal laws it can at least do the important job of underwriting 
strategy. It is not as good as truth, of course, since there will be myriads of 
true predictions about what happens if a course of action is undertaken 
that do not fall into already existing patterns. Invariance shares with truth, 
however, the drawback that it is hard to recognize. And despite the recent 
tsunami of commitment to invariance, there has not been much advance 
on how to know when we have it. Pearl supposes we have invariant 
causal laws and builds his semantics for effectiveness counterfactuals 
from these. Statisticians and econometricians have a variety of methods 
for testing for invariance, and this is a hot topic at the moment, but they 
are extremely limited in their usefulness, for two reasons. First, their range 
of application is limited. Worse, they are testing post hoc, not predicting. 
But for betting on strategies we need, rather, good ways for telling before 
hand, for predicting the range of the causal law. 
We can do better, much better, if we stop skating on the surface. 
Unless we are dealing with the most basic laws of fundamental physics, 
invariance is a derivative feature. It comes from somewhere else. My 
version of the somewhere else is the nomological machine. However 
exactly we conceive it, that's where we need to focus to identify and to 
understand effective strategies. 
To summarize: for effective strategies, 
Invariance is good, though it does not salvage causal laws. Once we 
have invariance we don't need causality. 
Truth is better. It provides us with a larger set of effective 
strategies. 
But neither truth nor invariance wears its label on its sleeve. We 
need something we can identify reasonably, readily, and reliably. 
7. Nomological machines 
Finally we have arrived at Thesis 3: The laws that support our day-to-day 
strategies are for the most part the temporally asymmetric conditionally 
stable input/output relations arising from the successful operation of a 
nomological machine. 
A nomological machine, recall, is a stable (enough) arrangement 
of components whose features acting in consort give rise to (relatively) 
stable input/output relations. Some nomological mechanics are fairly 
"watertight": In normal conditions there's a constrained set of inputs 
they admit and these fairly reliably lead to canonical outputs. Others are 
more porous: They more often admit inputs that disrupt their canonical 
input/output relations. Nomological machines are often constructed by us. 
For example, toasters, cars, the UK financial system, hospital emergency 
admissions, and referral systems,... They also commonly occur naturally, 
at all levels: seeds, the Suprachiasmatic nuclei that Bechtel studies, the 
human body, ecosystems, ... 
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Consider my toaster. Drop in a piece of bread and push the lever. This 
regularly causes a piece of nicely browned toast to pop up a minute and 
a half later. 
This sequence has all the earmarks of a causal law. 
And it is invariant 
o so long as we push the lever on the toaster and not on the 
floor of my car 
o so long as my toaster's design is intact. 
And it provides an effective strategy (one I rely on every morning 
for my breakfast). 
Importantly, this causal law is local to the toaster and guaranteed by 
it. 
Or consider the nasturtium seed. The Royal Horticultural Society 
Encyclopaedia of Gardening notes, "In order to germinate, a seed needs 
water, air, warmth, and, for some species, light."29 It is a relatively reliable 
causal law that the right mix of water, air, warmth, and light produces 
nasturtium seedlings. The law is local to the seed?you won't get seedlings 
by planting and watering basketballs?and it is guaranteed by the structure 
of the seed. As with the toaster, this causal law provides a strategy we 
employ again and again. 
There are two central reasons we can rely on nomological machines 
for producing predictable results: 
1. First, we often can learn to recognize these machines and what it 
takes to obtain an effective strategy from them. In particular we learn to 
recognize 
The machine itself. Often there are good markers by which we do 
so 
o Labels 
o Other visible signs. 
Its canonical input/output relations, via 
o The manual that comes with the machine 
o Trial and error (e.g., "There is no way of distinguishing seeds 
requiring dark conditions from those needing light by physical 
examination; if the dark/light requirement is unknown, initially 
sow the seed in the dark; if it fails to germinate.. .place it in the 
light"30) 
o Scientific study (e.g., RCTs to establish the output of treatment 
inputs on human bodies) 
o ... 
What endangers stable operation. 
o Again, often there are markers or visible signs by which we 
recognize damage. 
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2. Second is the nature of the inputs. For many nomological machines? 
in particular the ones that supply the strategies we use? 
The input causes are ones we can (or can learn how to) 
manipulate 
And can reasonably reliably do so without breaking the machine. 
So my claim is: 
Most of the day-to-day effective strategies we rely on are underwritten 
by lawlike regularities generated by nomological machines and that 
many nomological machines, and notably the ones we rely on, have 
characteristics that make them both recognizable and usable by 
us. If you want to know if a proposed strategy will be effective you 
should look for the nomological machine that provides a reliable 
association between the strategy and the desired result. And if 
you want to know the range over which the strategy is effective, 
there is no substitute for figuring out what machine generates the 
connection. The lever on the door handle or on the toaster can 
look exactly like the lever on the floor of my car. To know whether 
pushing on it will accelerate you out of the garage rather than 
provide you with the morning's breakfast, you've got to know that 
you are in the car. 
8. Why it's not just longer and longer causal laws 
As philosophers you will naturally have a question in mind: So...we are 
not to pay too much heed to causal laws but instead focus on nomological 
machines. But aren't the principles that govern the operations of 
nomological machines causal laws? I say "No." 
Along with other Engineers, I picture two tiers at work in nature: 
nomological machines?engines?and the "invariant" laws they give rise 
to. You can try to flatten out this landscape by bringing the description 
of the nomological machine into the antecedent of the causal law it 
generates. Then it becomes a flat landscape with a big bump in it, and?you 
miss the point. Putting the description of the machine in the antecedent 
makes the causal laws very long, and very complicated; there must be an 
inexhaustible number of these laws; and there is no apparent system to 
them. More importantly for my thesis, this open-ended, higgledy-piggledy 
collection of causal laws is not God-given. These laws have to be made, 
and we have the power to make them, and to make them different, by 
building different nomological machines. 
What matters about nomological machines, whether constructed from 
iron and steel or from flesh and blood, is that they are made of parts with 
features that have powers and potentialities. Because of these powers and 
potentialities the parts can be assembled, and reassembled, in different 
ways to generate different causal laws. To understand these causal laws, 
and in particular to understand the ways in which they are fragile and the 
range across which they can be relied on, you need to understand what 
the parts can do, how they can work together, and what enables and what 
endangers their working together. 
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How should we characterize the basic facts of nature that determine 
what things can do and how they can act in consort? I talk about powers, 
about enabling conditions, and about rules of combination.31 I'd be happy 
for someone to do better. What matters is that these basic facts are not yet 
more causal laws. And what matters for practice is that we cannot find out 
about them with the same techniques we use to discover causal laws. 
This is the problem with evidence-based policy right now. There are a 
great many guides on offer about how to judge effectiveness, from the U.S. 
Dept. of Education, to the UK's National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 
to the International Association for Research on Cancer; and they are 
all much of a muchness. RCTs are their gold standard. But RCTs are just 
the bad penny yet again, and this time where it affects our lives. It is via 
principle (CC) that RCTs can establish causal laws;32 and principle (CC), 
we have seen, can predict the effectiveness of policies only under the 
most constrained kinds of manipulations. The evidence-based policy fix 
is the same as that of the Mechanics: invariance, or external validity; use 
a causal law only where it will hold. And how are we supposed to know 
where that will be? The U.S. Dept. of Education is typical in its advice: 
You are entitled to assume a program will be effective in your school if 
it has passed two good RCTs in "a setting similar to that of your schools/ 
classrooms."33 I advise instead that we try to understand the underlying 
arrangement that will enable the program to produce the desired result. 
And we won't do that by conducting more RCTs. 
9. In Sum 
My point in this address is to get you worried about causal laws. Because 
you should be. They are not all they are cracked up to be. I am particularly 
concerned about this because of my recent work on evidence-based 
policy,34 which focuses exclusively on establishing causal laws. But causal 
laws are neither necessary nor sufficient for predicting the effectiveness 
of strategy. My second point is to get you worried about invariance as a fix. 
Thirdly, I want to get you to focus on nomological machines, which are the 
engines of orderly behavior. 
We are worried about change. But we are far too conservative in our 
views about how to bring it about. We can jiggle causes to get the effects 
we want. Except that doesn't work unless the lever connecting the two is 
tempered. So we must be very cautious: Just jiggle very carefully, so as 
to leave the causal laws invariant. Tempering becomes a process that we 
cannot act without. 
But cherishing invariance denies us a more powerful, more 
fundamental tool for bringing about what we want. Do not just try to jiggle 
the cause paying strict attention to leaving the causal laws as they are. 
Rather, change the causal laws. As the Mechanics claim, tempered causal 
laws are mechanisms, but in the nineteenth-century sense. They are 
repetitive, able to transmit causal influence, but without serious productive 
power. We can jiggle one end of a tempered lever to move things at the 
other; and that is a big help. But for fundamental change, we can redesign 
the engines. 
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My predecessor at the London School of Economics, Karl Popper, 
insisted that we should engage in only limited piecemeal social planning. 
That's precisely because in his view we can neither understand nor build 
big engines of change. The same premise counsels no planning at all, 
as with Robert Lucas. For if we don't understand the engines of change, 
we do not know the stretch of our inductions and even piecemeal social 
planning is dicey. But we can build toasters, and high speed computers, 
and artificial knees that work. In all these cases we create new causal 
laws and we do so by creating new nomological machines. What about 
schools, child welfare, and international HIV-AIDS policies then? Lucas is, 
unfortunately, all too right about many of the interventions we attempt. The 
causal laws we rely on are altogether too fragile.35 And they are destined 
to remain so, I fear, so long as we hire Mechanics to devise them. Let's at 
least give it a go: Just say "No" to Popper and Lucas. With better science? 
and better philosophy to underwrite it?perhaps we can build new social 
engines that make for better societies. 
Endnotes 
1. Thanks to Sophia Efstathiou for a great deal of help in preparing the lecture 
slides and the written version of this address. Research for it was sponsored 
by the (UK) AHRC grant, "Contingency and Dissent in Science." My thinking 
on these issues has benefited greatly from working with both Julian Reiss 
and Damien Fennell. 
2. Cartwright 1979,420. 
3. This claim?causal laws are not much of a special guide to action?may 
seem hopelessly vague. But I think it is the right form for the conclusion 
to take. It is, after all, the equally vague claim that they are a guide that 
underwrites the huge expenditures we make to find causal laws. It is also, 
I think, the right abstract formulation to sit atop a number of more concrete 
claims expressed more precisely. Exactly what these concrete claims say 
depends on what characteristics one takes causal laws to have, what kind of 
actions are in view, and what rules are proposed for predicting the results of 
actions from causal laws. 
4. Bechtel 2008. 
5. Cf. Craver and Darden (2005) and references therein for their work and that 
of others on mechanisms. 
6. There are other senses as well. Notably, a call to provide the mechanism 
between C and E is often a request for the causal process that connects the 
two, but represented in a series of steps where each step is described in a 
way that brings it under a "familiar" causal principle. I think this is what John 
Pemberton labels a "causal roll forward model" (in "How-mechanisms," 
2009, ms: John.m.pemberton@btinternet.com) and that Jeremy Howick 
talks about in discussing mechanisms in evidence-based medicine in 
Howick (forthcoming). 
7. Wise 2007. 
8. Wise 2007, 163. 
9. Wise 2007, 166. 
20 Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 83:2 
10. Wise 2007, 168-69. 
11. Woodward 2003. 
12. Pearl 2000. 
13. Steel 2008. 
14. Hendry 2001. 
15. Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993. 
16. Williamson 2005. 
17. Hitchcock 1993. 
18. Skyrms 1980. 
19. This isn't the formulation in any of the works at the time but it is the one I 
would choose now. Also note that the causal Markov condition of Bayes' 
nets stratifies on other "direct" causes of C, not of E. In both cases the effect 
is to control for common causes that may induce correlations between C 
and E. 
20. If the notion of a causal route is taken as given, then K. is a state description 
over the set containing one factor from each route into E that does not go 
through C. Others define it using the notion of a causal parent, but I think 
this latter notion is always representation dependent and hence does not 
provide a proper way to pick out the members of K.. 
21. Yet, common causes are not always the only other possible explanation. For 
instance, I'm always worried about what is called "selection bias" in picking 
out the populations whose probabilities are being studied. I also argue that 
non-deterministic causes can produce effects in tandem so stratifying on a 
probabilistic cause need not eliminate the correlation between its common 
effects. So looking for these kinds of partial correlations is a sure-fire way to 
test for causal laws only in special kinds of systems where the other possible 
explanations are already ruled out. And that's a problem since the formula is 
often put forward as if it were universally a good test, not the least by me in 
my earliest work. 
22. For a single case one may require merely a cause-kind that is a cause on 
that particular occasion. I am here supposing that for deliberation we want a 
cause-kind that is connected by a causal law with the effect-kind. 
23. Bohrnstedt and Stecher 2002. 
24. Lucas 1981. 
25. Mitchell 2003. 
26. Or even just "truth enough for the purposes at hand." 
27. Reiss 2009. 
28. Friedman 1953. 
29. Brickell 1993, 536. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Cf. Cartwright 1989, 1999, 2007a, 2007b. 
32. For a defence of this see Cartwright 2007c, Cartwright (under review), and 
Cartwright and Munro (forthcoming). 
33. U.S. Department of Education 2003. 
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34. See Nancy Cartwright's personal webpage for her papers on evidence. 
Available at: http://personal.Ise.ac.uk/cartwrig/Default.htm 
35. For a discussion of this with respect to HIV-AIDS polices, see Seckinelgin 
2007. 
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